State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe

The Theory of Stein Rokkan

Based on his collected works.
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with
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I want to trace the outlines of a possible unifying model by linking elements from my early work on processes of mobilisation with elements in my current search for a pattern in the geopolitical/geo-economic history of Western Europe. The model spans the entire history of state formation, nation-building, and mass politics in Western Europe; it represents an attempt to identify the crucial variables in the long and complex process that led up to the current constellations of territories, economies, and political alignment systems. The essential message of the model is simple enough: you cannot explain the marked variations in the structuring of mass politics in Western Europe without going far back in history, without analysing the differences in the initial conditions and the early processes of territorial organisation, of state building, of resource combination.

In practice this means going back to the fall of the Western Roman Empire and the long sequence of efforts to establish a viable successor empire to the north of the Alps. To understand the later development we have to identify the decisive differences across this Western European territory in the conditions of centre formation and territorial expansion. These constellations of conditions in their turn set the stage for the further sequences of change: the fragmentations of the German–Roman Empire, the build-up of strong dynastic states at the edges of that loosely structured system, the violent upsurge of Atlantic capitalism, and the establishment of Western empires across the oceans.

[A MODEL OF EUROPE]14

The primary elements of the model are set out in Figure 12. The elements are grouped by period and by type. The grouping by period
FIGURE 12. The primary elements of the model [of Europe]
reflects the basic analytical design: there is a set of precondition variables, a set of intervening process variables, and there is finally a set of explicanda. The precondition and the intervening variables are again grouped by type into essentially economic variables, territorial variables, and cultural variables. There is a corresponding typology at the level of the explicanda: there a distinction is made between variables characterising the extent of rights of participation and variables describing the alternatives set for mass politics, whether at the total-system level or at the level of parties. Each of the variables is indicated in simple keyword style: full explication would take us far beyond the confines of this first statement.

The model does not cover the whole of Europe: to keep it within manageable bounds it concentrates on the Europe of the Celtic, the Latin, and the Germanic peoples. There is some fuzziness on the eastern marches: most of the accounting schemes include Finland because of the heavy dominance of the Swedes until 1809 but exclude Estonia, Hungary, and the Slavic states re-established or reorganised after 1918. The model starts out from a simple classification of sources of variation in the early Middle Ages: it identifies as an important economic variable the type of agrarian structure predominant in each area; it identifies as a territorial variable par excellence the degree of exposure to the efforts of empire-building under Charlemagne and his successors, and it suggests as an equally important cultural variable the ethnic/linguistic composition of the population of the given territory. The model proceeds to a corresponding specification of variables for the first major periods of structural change: the establishment of a strong network of cities running from the Mediterranean to the North Sea during the High Middle Ages and the consolidation of strong nation-states during the troubled decades of economic expansion and internecine religious conflict from 1492 to 1648.

The model does not specify the same broad range of variables for the period of consolidation from the Treaty of Westphalia to the French Revolution: for this stage of development the model retains only one source of variation, the strength of representative institutions during the reign of absolutism.

This complex set of Precondition Variables offers a springboard for the analysis of a set of Intervening Process Variables in the model: these are the variables posited as essential in any systematic account of the generation of cleavage fronts during the century and a half after the French Revolution. This was again a period of great political turmoil: the French Revolution set the stage for a wide variety of efforts of centralisation, territorial consolidation, national self-assertion, and the Industrial Revolution brought about even greater contrasts between the economically advanced core territories and the stagnant provinces and peripheries. The interaction of these parallel revolutions generated complex variations in cleavage structures and these in their turn produced marked differences in the style and the structure of the emerging politics of mass mobilisation across Western Europe.

This complex set of Intervening Process Variables finally offers a springboard for the analysis of the Explicanda, the variations in political response structures. Here again the model specifies two stages and three sectors of variation. At the first stage, questions are asked about the structuring of political alternatives: what sorts of options were set for the emerging mass citizens and how stable, how vulnerable did these structures turn out to be? At the final stage questions are asked about the decisive dimensions of mass alignments in each territorial system: what is the weight of ethnic/religious/cultural commitments, what difference can be found between ascending and stagnant classes and strata, between the old and the new middle class, between the peasantry and the industrial working class?

The model reduces the great complexity of territorial histories to a series of concatenated constellations of variables over time. The variables can be used to characterise units at different levels of complexity. To use the term so dear to the Annales school, you can read the scheme en aval, downstream, as well as en amont, upstream. Reading the scheme en aval, you can use the variables as direct attributes of historical regions, pays, Landschaften, or as contextual attributes of the larger units they are integrated into. An example: Alsace as a region can be characterised directly as located within the central city belt (variable I:T) but also contextually as integrated into the absolutist French system during the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries (variable III:T). By contrast reading the scheme en amont, you start off with the territorial units established after, say, 1945, and characterise these either directly or through aggregations of the values for their constituent units. To use France again as our example: post-1945 France may be characterised directly as administratively unitary and central-
ised (an extrapolation from variable II-T) but not as ethnically/linguistically homogeneous because of the incorporation of such culturally diverse territories as Brittany, Flanders, Lorraine, Alsace, Savoie and Nice, Occitania, Roussillon, and the Basque region. In most of the accounting schemes presented here we shall follow this en amont procedure but we shall on several occasions have to break up our post-1945 units in order to bring out analytically important distinctions.

Reading the scheme en amont we proceed by way of retrospective diachronics: given an observed contrast in the values of variables at time t₀, what combinations of variables for earlier phases t₁, t₂, and so on, can best account for these differences? The total operation requires work at three levels: first, the level of each territorial case—the checking of historical, institutional, and statistical information, to assess the position of the case on each variable, whether a precondition variable, an interactive process variable, or an explicandum; secondly, at the level of the specific accounting scheme—which combinations of variables offer the best basis for an explanation of a given contrast in a later-phase variable and what further evidence can be brought to bear on the plausibility of hypotheses about the effects of each combination? Thirdly, at the level of the overall model and total inventory of variables and dimensions—how can the different accounting schemes be reconciled within the overall model and how can the model be parsimoniously restructured to bring in variables which have proved important elements in particular accounting schemes?

This is not the place to go into all the complexities of this effort at systematisation. What needs to be emphasised is the multidimensionality of the model: at each stage it gives equal weight to economic/technological, political/territorial, and cultural/ethnic/religious dimensions. There is no economic determinism in the model, nor a geopolitical, nor a cultural: in this sense it seeks to combine the traditions of Karl Marx with those of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. The model recognises the great importance of the breakthrough to a world economy in the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries: on this point there is complete agreement with Immanuel Wallerstein. But the model also stresses the political and cultural preconditions of this breakthrough and the importance of territorial organisations and cultural identity structures in the further processes of change triggered by the emergence of the world economy. The central task for systematic macro-history is the analy-

sis of the dynamics of interaction between the economic, the political, and the cultural systems: each system has its specific rhythm and its specific boundaries but the fate of a particular territory and its institutions is determined through processes of interaction among the systems, across their boundaries.

The model seeks to balance contextual totality against systematic parsimony. No single explanatory or intervening variable can be linked up with a dependent variable in isolation from the context, whether across systems or across stages. And no variable can justify its position in the scheme simply because it helps to describe the conditions in one particular system at one particular stage: to qualify for inclusion in the analysis a variable must specify a necessary or a sufficient condition for a patent difference in later-stage outcomes between at least two distinct systems. So far only part of the model has been subjected to detailed testing against such criteria.

The bulk of the efforts thus far have concentrated on the link-ups between ‘cleavage generation’ variables (rows IV and V in Figure 12) and variables for the ‘structuring of political alternatives’ (row VI), particularly the steps in the extension of suffrage rights and the genealogies of party systems. An attempt has also been made at a systematisation of the links between the Precondition Variables and the Intervening Process Variables: these links have been expressed in a ‘topological typology’ of territories, in what has been called a ‘conceptual map of Europe’. But very little has been done to link up variables across the entire range of stages in the model: this statement in fact represents a first serious effort in this direction.

A CONCEPTUAL MAP OF EUROPE

Three of the Precondition Variables combine to produce a ‘conceptual map of Europe’. This is a schematised system of co-ordinates generated through the combination of one territorial, one economic and one cultural variable in the model:

| Period I: | Economy (E) | Strength/structure of city network |
| Period I: | Territory (T) | Geopolitical Position |
| Period II: | Culture (C) | Outcome of Reformation |
Variables I:E and I:T combine to produce a five-step west–east typology. Variable II:C divides the Europe once dominated by the Roman Church into three slices from south to north. This gives the two-dimensional map set out in Figure 13. In this map the west–east axis differentiates the economic resource bases of the state-building centres: surpluses from a highly monetised economy in the West, surpluses from agricultural labour in the East. The north–south axis measures the conditions for rapid cultural integration: the early closing of the borders in the Protestant North, the continued suprateritoriality of the Church in the Catholic South.

This conceptual map reflects the fundamental asymmetry of the geopolitical structure of Europe: the dominant city network of the politically fragmented trade belt from the Mediterranean toward the north, the strength of the cities in the territories consolidated to the seaward side of this belt, the weakness of the cities in the territories brought together under the strong military centres on the landward marchland. The west–east contrast is the underlying dimension [of] Barrington Moore’s analysis in Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966). He does not discuss the middle belt, but his contrast between the seaward powers, England and France, and the landward powers, Prussia and Russia, is directly reflected in the west–east gradient in the map. Essentially this was a contrast in the levels of monetisation reached at the time [of] the decisive consolidation of the territorial centres; England and France during the sixteenth century, Prussia and Russia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the West the great surge of commercial activity made it possible for the centre-builders to extract resources in easily convertible currency. In the east, the cities were much weaker partners and could not offer the essential resource base for the building of the military machineries of the new centres at the periphery of the old Europe. The only alternative partners were the owners of land, and the resources they could offer were food and manpower: crofters, tenants, and smallholders in Sweden; serfs in Austria, Prussia, and Russia. This contrast in the resource bases for political consolidation goes far to explain the difference between the Western and the Eastern systems in their internal structure and in the character of the later transition to mass politics. This contrast is the thrust of Moore’s detailed analysis. It does not explain all the cases, however, and does not pinpoint the sources of variation on each side;
there are important variations both on the seaward and the landward sides, and these can only be understood through an analysis of the other dimensions of the polity, quite particularly the cultural.

In the conceptual map of Europe the west–east axis differentiates conditions of state-building, the south–north axis the conditions of nation-building. In the underlying model of development the Reformation is interpreted as the first major step toward the definition of territorial nations. Lutherans and Calvinists broke with the supraterritoriality of the Roman Church and merged the ecclesiastical bureaucracies with the secular territorial establishments: this action meant a closing of ‘exit options’ on the cultural front, an accentuation of the cultural significance of the borders between territories. The Reformation occurred only a few decades after Gutenberg; the state churches of the Protestant North became major agencies for the standardisation of national languages and for the socialisation of the masses into unified national cultures. In Catholic Europe the Church remained supraterritorial and did not to the same extent prove an agency of nation-building. True enough, the Catholic Church played a major role in the development of peripheral nationalisms in some of the territories of Counter-Reformation Europe, but these were much later developments; they occurred in the aftermath of the French Revolution and took the form of alliances between the Church and nationalist or secessionist leaders against the rulers at the centre, whether Protestant (Belgium before 1830, Ireland from the 1820s onward), Orthodox (Poland, Lithuania), or simply secularising (the Carlist wars in Spain). Even in the most loyal of the Counter-Reformation states, the Church remained supraterritorial in outlook and never became central agencies of nation-building in the way the Protestant churches did in the north.19

The two ‘centre-characterising’ variables account for much of the variance in the character of political developments in the different territories of Europe but they obviously cannot be analysed in isolation. We have already touched on the third of the four ‘master’ variables: the control of resources in the primary economy. There were important differences in the structure of the rural economy both on the seaward side (England and Scotland vs. Denmark and Norway) and on the landward side (Austria and Prussia vs. Sweden), and these clearly counted not only in the early phase of institution-building but even more in the phase of mass mobilisation and party formation: the history of the agrarian parties in Europe cannot possibly be understood without detailed analysis of these differences (see Rokkan no. 104: 44–6 and no. 125: 126–9).

Similarly on the cultural side: we cannot understand the variations in the alliances of the Church and their impact on mass mobilisation and party formation without considering the initial conditions for development of some central standard of linguistic communication within the territory. The Völkerwanderung and the struggles of the Middle Ages had produced very different conditions for linguistic unification in the different territories of Europe. The vast territories of the Chinese Empire were kept together through the medium of idiographic script. The Roman Empire left the heritage of the Latin language but the alphabetic script allowed the vernaculars to rise to the level of literary standards: this produced the extraordinary fragmentation of Europe and generated a variety of conflicts between claims for territorial control and claims of national identity. There was nowhere a complete fit between the ‘state’ and the ‘nation’ and the conflicts between the two sets of claims were particularly violent in the central trade-route belt and in Catholic Europe.

The long sequence of migration, centre-building, cultural standardisation, and boundary imposition produced an extraordinary tangle of territorial structures in Europe: some large, some small, some highly centralised, others made up of differentiated networks of self-reliant cities. The alphabet and the city decided the fate of Europe: the emergence of vernacular standards of communication prepared the ground for the later stages of nation-building at the mass level, and the geography of trade routes made for differences in the resources for state-building between east and west.

The great paradox of European development is that the strongest and the most durable systems emerged at the periphery of the old Empire: the heartlands and the Italian and German territories remained fragmented and dispersed until the nineteenth century. To reach some understanding of this paradox we have to reason in several steps:

1. The heartland of the old Western Empire was studded with cities in a broad trade-route belt stretching from the Mediterranean to the east as well as west of the Alps northward to the Rhine and to the Danube.
2. This ‘city belt’ was at the same time the stronghold of the Roman Catholic Church; this territory had a high density of cathedrals, monasteries, and ecclesiastical principalities.

3. The very density of established centres within this territory made it difficult to single out any one as superior to all others; there was no geography-given core area for the development of a strong territorial system.  

4. The resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire under the leadership of the four German tribes did not help to unify the territory; the emperors were prey to shifting electoral alliances; many of them were mere figureheads, and the best and the strongest of them expended their energies in quarrels with the Pope and with the Italian cities.

5. By contrast, it proved much easier to develop effective core areas at the edges of the city-studded territories of the old Empire; in these regions, centres could be built up under less competition and could achieve command of the resources in peripheral areas too far from the cities in the central trade belt.

6. The earliest successes in such efforts of system-building at the edges of the old Empire came in the west and in the north, in France, in England, in Scandinavia, later also in Spain; in all these cases the dynasties in the core areas were able to command resources from peripheral territories largely beyond the reach of the cities of the central trade belt.

7. The second wave of successful centre-building took place on the landward side: first the Habsburgs, with their core area in Austria; then the eastern march of the German Empire; next the Swedes; and finally, and decisively, the Prussians.

8. The fragmented middle belt of cities and petty states was the scene of endless onslaughts, counter-moves, and efforts of reorganisation during the long centuries from Charlemagne to Bismarck: firstly, the French monarchs gradually took over the old Lotharingian-Burgundian buffer zone from Provence to Flanders and incorporated such typical trade cities as Avignon, Aix, and Lyons; secondly, the key cities to the north of the Alps managed to establish a defence league against all comers and gradually built up the Swiss confederation; similar leagues were established along the Rhine and across the Baltic and the North Sea but never managed to establish themselves as sovereign territorial formations; thirdly, the Habsburgs made a number of encroachments both on the west and on the east of the belt and for some time controlled the crucial territories at the mouth of the Rhine triggering the next successful effort of consociational confederation, the United Netherlands; finally, in the wake of the French Revolution, Napoleon moved across the middle belt both north and south of the Alps and set in motion a series of efforts of unification which ended with the successes of the Prussians and the Piedmontese in 1870.
II

The Territorial Structuring of Europe

In this part we shall proceed to present an overall picture of the territorial system of Western Europe, trying to place each of the single-country centre–periphery structures within its broader context, whether 'geo-ethnic', geo-economic, or geopolitical. We shall first review the consequences of the successive waves of migration, conquest, and occupation for the peopling of Western Europe and the establishment of lasting ethnic/linguistic boundaries. We shall next review the changes that occurred between the Middle Ages and the seventeenth century, and analyse their consequences for the building of territorial units: the emergence of a dynamic city belt within the German–Roman Empire, the rise of strong nation-states to the west and later to the east of this belt.

Any analytical history of centre formation and periphery incorporation in Western Europe must start out from six 'givens':

- first, the heritage of the Roman Empire, the supremacy of the Emperor, the systematisation of legal rules, the idea of citizenship;
- second, the supraterritorial, cross-ethnic organisations of the Catholic Church and its central role in the channelling of elite communications during the millennium after the fall of the Western Empire;
- third, the Germanic kingdoms and the traditions of legislative/judicial assemblies of free heads of families;
- fourth, the extraordinary revival of trade between the Orient, the Mediterranean, and the North Sea after the defeat of the Moslems and the consequent growth of a network of independent cities across Western Europe from Italy to Flanders and the Baltic;
- fifth, the development and consolidation of feudal and manorial agrarian structures and the consequent concentrations of landholdings in important areas of the West;
sixth and finally the emergence of literatures in vernacular languages and the gradual decline of the dominant medium of cross-ethnic communication, Latin, particularly after the invention of printing.

These 'givens' combined to produce a variety of strikingly different configurations during the crucial state-building period from around the eleventh to the eighteenth century. Four dimensions stood out as crucially important in the generation of these different systems of territorial control:

- first, the geopolitical distance northward from Rome, the fountainhead of the old Empire, the focus of Western Christendom after the Schism of 1054 and the symbolic centre for the effort of legal unification through the revival of Roman Law;
- second, the geopolitical distance westwards or eastwards from the central belt of trade route cities from Northern Italy to the areas once controlled by the Hanseatic League;
- third, the concentrations of land holdings and the consequent independence or dependence of the peasantry; and
- fourth, the ethnic basis of the early efforts of centre-building and the linguistic conditions for early vs. late consolidation.

[In chapter I.1] the process of development [of territorial systems has been] analysed from the vantage point of an isolated primordial community: a closely knit, kinship-regulated local unit covering only a small territory and commanding only elementary technologies of communication [see Figure 4]. The model posits three part-processes of peripheralisation under increasingly powerful systems of long-distance communication and control: one military-administrative, one economic, and one cultural. For each of these processes of territorial aggregation, the model posits a distinctive set of centralising agencies.

But the model does not only serve as a tool for the comparative analysis of large-scale efforts of territorial aggregation: it has proved much more directly useful in the study of processes of fragmentation, retrenchment, and reorganisation of territorial structures. Figure 14 shows how the model can be used to study the combinatorics of processes of breakdown in [the] case [of] the disintegration of the Western Roman Empire. The midpoints on each of the three core vectors sug-
gest three distinctive modes of disintegration: feudalisation, vernacularisation, and centre formation on the periphery of the fallen empire. What proved crucial in the Western European case was that these three processes got out of phase with each other and that these differences in the timing and impact of the processes produced very different configurations from south to north and from west to east.

These contrasts are spelled out in the [following] discussion of the 'conceptual map' [see also chapter I.4]. The gist of this typological-topological scheme can be stated in two sentences. The emergence of the city belt from south to north in Europe stopped the process of feudal fragmentation and produced a new and powerful thrust of long-distance communication and boundary transcendence, while the strengthening of vernacular cultures and the development of major territorial centres at the edges of the empire accelerated the break-up of the old system, consolidated new sets of boundaries, and set the stage for the development of a range of highly distinctive political systems within Western Europe. The breakthrough toward merchant capitalism produced a world network of economic transactions and undermined established boundaries, while the emergence of strong nation-states tended to mark off clear-cut boundaries and accentuate territorial identity and citizenship.

In [its] original formulation the model not only ignored details of social, economic, and political history, it also ran roughshod over differences in ethnic legacies and traditional affinities among local and regional cultures within and across the politically and economically defined boundaries. To put it bluntly: the model left out of account the complex ethnic configurations produced by the successive Völkerwanderungen. The disintegration of Western Europe and the subsequent attempts at territory-building toward the north, west, and east were only too obviously affected by these large-scale movements of ethnically distinctive populations. These differed not only in their languages and customs but also in their ideas of governance, their styles of centre-building, and their resistance to peripheralisation.

We have tried to identify three fundamental dimensions in the tangled histories of the territories of Western Europe: the strength of the city network, the strength of state-building core areas, and the resistance to cultural unification and standardisation—to nation-building. These three dimensions combined to produce the extraordinary diversity of political systems in the territories once under the sway of one single empire—variations not only in size, but also in the urban structure and in the cultural balance within each territory.

THE PEOPLING OF EUROPE

We cannot get anywhere toward an explanation of the successive changes in the territorial structure of Western Europe without some knowledge of the many waves of migration, conquest and occupation which have layered the ethnic/linguistic landscape since the Early Iron Age. We can distinguish a total of seven major waves:

1. The Celtic expansion: the Celts moved out from their heartland between the Rhine and the Danube from the sixth century BC and occupied large tracts of Gaul, Iberia, Britain, and even Greece.

2. The long series of Roman conquests: the Empire moved westward into Southern Gaul and Iberia, northward toward the limes on the Rhine and the Danube, and then into Britain all the way up to the massive walls built against the aggressive Picts in Caledonia.

3. The multiple invasions of the Germanic tribes into the crumbling Western Empire during the fourth and fifth centuries: the Ostrogoths, Visigoths, and Vandals all covered long stretches of territory on their way towards the Mediterranean: the Lombards settled in Northern Italy,
the Burgundians in Eastern Gaul, the Franks in Northern Gaul, and the Jutes, Angles, and Saxons in parts of Britannia.

4. The eighth-century wave of Arab conquest northwards across Iberia and briefly even far into Gaul: this great push of Islamic forces was countered by a number of Christian counter-thrusts, first into Spain, later, with the Crusades, across the length of the Mediterranean.

5. The succession of Viking raids and conquests: beyond all the plunder and devastation, these produced lasting settlements in Normandy, Ireland, England, and even in Sicily and Southern Italy.

6. The westward drift of the Slavs and the Finno-Ugric peoples into the territories to the landward side of the Germans: the most spectacular consequences were the founding of Bohemian, Polish, Hungarian, and Serbian kingdoms during the tenth and eleventh centuries and the beginnings of a Russian Empire centred on Kiev.

7. The eastward expansion of the Germans from the twelfth century onwards: part of the great drive to Christianise the rest of Europe, this was accompanied by well-planned efforts to colonise and improve poorly used agricultural land. The result was a thorough penetration of German settlers, religious orders, and merchants far into Slavic and Baltic lands, and a long history of conflict between the marchland rulers and the kingdoms to the east.

These successive waves of conquest and occupation, penetration and retrenchment, produce a complex distribution of ethnic/linguistic groupings across Western Europe. Simplifying in the extreme, we can reduce this to a simple geo-ethnic map (Figure 15). Starting from the seaward fringe we can distinguish four sets of ethnic groupings along a west–east gradient:

- first, an Atlantic periphery made up of the Celtic and the Basque lands and, after the collapse of the early Norwegian North Sea Empire, even West Norway, the Orkneys, Shetland, the Faroes, and Iceland;
- second, the western coastal plains, the heartland of the early seaward kingdoms—the Anglo-Saxon, the Frankish and, considerably later and in a different context, the Iberian;
- third, the central plains between the Meuse–Rhône line and the Elbe, the heartland of the German–Roman Empire;
- fourth, the landward periphery caught in the cross-pressure be-
between German and Swedish empire-building thrusts and the resistance of the Slavs, Magyars, and Finns.

Each of these four west–east slices can in turn be divided into at least three distinctive layers from north to south:

- first, the lands beyond the reach of the Roman Empire: Ireland, Scotland, Northern Germany, Scandinavia, Poland, the Baltic;
- second, the imperial lands north of the Alps: England and Wales, France, Switzerland, Southern Germany and Austria, Hungary;
- third, the Mediterranean lands, the territories most heavily imprinted by Latin institutions, least influenced by the Germanic invaders.

These territorial distributions provided the ethnic/linguistic infrastructures for the institutional developments of the High Middle Ages: the first step towards the consolidation of centralised monarchies, the early city leagues, the first consociational structures. In the next round, the distributions of ethnic identities and affinities determined the character and the cost of linguistic standardisation within each of these territorial structures. The development of such central standards was accelerated by the invention of printing and the religious conflicts of the Reformation and put the peripheries under heavy pressures to accept the norms set by the territorial centres.

VARIEATIONS IN THE STRUCTURE OF CITY NETWORKS

The historical distribution of central cities in Western Europe was heavily influenced by the successive changes in dominant trade routes. The Mediterranean Sea helped to orient trade along an east–west axis until the downfall of the Roman Empire and the conquest of Islam. In the next phase, the decisive trade routes turned northwards, from Italy across the Alps to the North Sea and the Baltic: the result was a closely knit string of cities, first within the Roman, later within the German–Roman Empire. This phase lasted until the fifteenth–sixteenth century: then the route across the Alps declined in importance and the sea routes along Western Europe and across the world oceans took over.

Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries there was a continuous strengthening of dominant centres within territories to the west or the east of the medieval trade-route belt: London, Paris, and Madrid on the Atlantic side, Vienna, Munich, Berlin, and Stockholm on the landward side. These centres controlled larger peripheries and could build great military–administrative strength, resources which counted heavily in the next round of network building: the construction of national railway systems after the 1830[s]. Whether privately or publicly financed, the investments made in the development of rail networks helped to strengthen the established structure of national and regional centres: in fact we may go so far as to say that the railway system ‘froze’ the structure for more than a century.

The city structure of each territory reflects the distances between the state-building core areas and the dominant trade routes: the greater the distance, the greater the dominance of the capital city; the shorter the distance, the more even the distributions of city strengths whether measured in terms of demographic size or in terms of territorial functions. The territories to the west as well as to the east of the central trade belt are largely monocephalic: they were built up around strong state-building core areas and there was no serious competition from the cities nearer to the old south–north routes. There is an intriguing exception at the Mediterranean end of the belt, however. The conceptual map focuses on a south–north trade axis but along the Mediterranean littorals there was of course a much older tradition of east–west trade, interrupted, it is true, by the Moslem conquests, but still of vital importance from the time of the Crusades onward.

The Mediterranean territories make up the broad base of our column for ‘city-state Europe’ (see Figure 13); at this point there is only a very poor fit between typology and topology. The greater strength of the city-state tradition in the south made it much more difficult to build up dominant core areas for large territorial systems: the result was polycephality, but of a much more polarised type than further north in Europe.

To clarify this point let us contrast the territorial development in the two southern corners of Western Europe: the Iberian peninsula in the west and the Habsburg territories in the east. Spain and Austria built up their core strengths as crusading frontier empires against the Moslems and the Turks: they both built up their core areas through the mobilisation of military–administrative resources against the threatening infidels. But Spain was much closer to the Mediterranean trade
belts: Madrid became the dominant political centre but could not compete economically with Barcelona. By contrast, Vienna built itself up as the dominant city on the marchlands: it was too far from the Mediterranean and the south-north trade belt and became overwhelmingly dominant in its territory after the fall of the Habsburg Empire.

This contrast comes out even clearer in a comparison with two other powers bordering on the Mediterranean, France and Yugoslavia. Much like the Spanish dynasties, the French nation-builders had integrated large chunks of the trade-route belt in their territories, Burgundy and Provence. But the Île-de-France core proved able to dominate these economically important peripheries much more effectively than the Castilians were able to control the Catalans. This contrast no doubt reflected differences in the resource balance between the two poles of each system, but it is also clear that there were differences in the cultural thrust of nation-building: French energies centred on the domestic territory, and Spanish energies were expended on empire-building and missionary activities in America.

There is a similar contrast in the southeastern corner of Europe: Austria markedly monocephalic, the much more recent Yugoslavian federation deeply divided economically as well as culturally. The parallels between Yugoslavia and Spain are indeed striking: in both cases there was a build-up of a military-administrative centre in the fight against foreign dominance; in both cases there were conflicts between these political centres and the economically stronger cities nearest to the major trade routes. Belgrade and Serbia parallel Madrid and Castilia; Ljubljana and Zagreb parallel Barcelona and Bilbao. In all cases, the economic strength of the peripheral cities reinforce the cultural distinctiveness of their regions; claims for economic autonomy parallel claims for cultural recognition.

The polarisation between economic and administrative centres was much less marked in the middle belt from Italy to the North Sea; all these territories developed polyccephalic city structures, but the distribution of functions tended to be more diffuse. Italy was unified from a mountain state to the north; the Piedmontese not only led politically but also economically and retained a good deal of control even after the transfer of the capital to Rome. Switzerland and The Netherlands developed remarkably balanced city structures: they stand out, as Daalder (1973) has shown, as the two polities in Europe with the most distinctly consociational structure. The basic model underlying these developments was the league of cities, an open contractual organisation for the protection of trading privileges and the control of markets. There was a profusion of such leagues in medieval and early modern Germany as well, but these proved geopolitically much less viable (see Dollinger 1970).

This vast area of independent cities and petty states could only be unified from outside. The Habsburgs tried to achieve this unification for centuries from their bases in Vienna and later from Brussels, but in vain. The final push toward unification came in three steps: first, the build-up of the Prussian state on the frontier toward the Slavs; next, the reorganisation of the German territory under Napoleon and the emergence of a strong nationalist ideology cutting across local loyalties; and, ultimately, the victory of the Prussians over the Austrians and the establishment of a Reich covering most of the territories of the German-speaking middle belt.23 The resulting city structure was markedly polyccephalic: Berlin, the political capital, had to compete with the strong centres of the old trade belt to the west.

[CENTRE FORMATION]

Let us, to simplify a series of complex territorial histories, first draw a crude conceptual map of Western Europe through the cross tabulation of two dimensions: the north-south ‘centre-culture’ axis and the west-east ‘centre-economy’ axis. This conceptual map of the territories of Western Christendom tells us a great deal about the sources of diversity within the region first to develop commercial-industrial nation-states. First of all, it is essential to note the importance of the city-studded centre for the structuring of efforts of territorial consolidation: the decisive thrusts toward the formation of nation-states came at the edges of the Old Empire, first on the seaward fringe, much later on the landward side. The cities of the trade-route belt from the Mediterranean to the North Sea and the Baltic were for centuries strong enough to thwart all efforts of military administration.

Paradoxically the history of Europe is one of centre formation at the periphery of a network of strong and independent cities: this explains the great diversity of configurations and the extraordinary tangles of
shifting alliances and conflicts. The trade-route belt produced a variety of short-term confederations of city states. The most famous of these was no doubt the Hanseatic League, at its peak a loose network of hundreds of cities and outposts from London to Bergen, Bruges to Visby. The only lasting systems of territorial control developed at two strategic points of the trade-route belt: in the Alps and at the estuaries of three of the great northward rivers. The Swiss and the Dutch confederations were essentially defensive in character. There was no strong conquest centre in the terminology of our grid of variables, but a network of strategically placed cities willing to pool their resources in defence of their trading privileges.

The only efforts of aggressive state-building took place on the fringes of economic Europe. In the smaller of these peripheral nation-states, the typical sequence was one of gradual build-up at the ethnic centre, rapid imperial expansion, consolidation within a more homogeneous territory. The Nordic monarchies built up wide-ranging empires before they were forced back to their ethnic heartlands: Denmark and Norway in the Middle Ages only, Sweden again in the seventeenth century. What was important in this sequence was that they could fall back on nationally unified and distinctive systems of law which bounded each territorial system and helped to prevent fragmentation.

The English monarchy went through a similar sequence: the retreat from France after the Hundred Years’ War set the stage for the great period of consolidation under the Tudors. The French monarchy took much longer to consolidate its territory: Breton and 'Occitan' ideologists will claim that the conquest of the West and the South built up an empire and not a nation, but these were conquests of a very different nature from the overseas acquisitions of the Norsemen and the English. In fact, the French did not engage in extensive empire-building beyond the consolidated metropolitan base until the seventeenth century, and even then with very little success. What is important in our context is that the French were the first to move successfully across the entire trade-route belt of Europe: after two centuries of absolutist centralisation France under Napoleon proved strong enough not only to subject Switzerland and the Low Countries, but also to conquer all of city-state Germany and Italy.

The Napoleonic Wars and the subsequent peace settlement of 1815 created vast upheavals throughout the continent. Changes important
for future developments included the granting to Prussia of important possessions on the Rhine, the transference of Norway from Denmark to Sweden, the handing over of Belgium to the Netherlands, and the transference of Finland from Sweden to Russia. Yet, overall, the basic structure of Western Europe remained much as it had been before the French Revolution: a polyccephalic fragmented city belt in the centre, with more monopcephalic states to its east and west, and beyond the latter the Atlantic and eastern buffer peripheries.

However, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars did leave a time bomb behind them: the idea of the nation-state and the ideal of popular sovereignty. While the 1815 Congress of Vienna had restored the traditional authority of crown and altar, the radical ideologies of the French Revolution spread continuously in the nineteenth century to produce a number of changes in the status of peripheral territories. The process began again in earnest with the second French revolution of 1830, bringing independence to Belgium. The repercussions of the next French revolution were even greater: 1848 marked the opening of the decisive struggle for unity within the city belt—the Italian Risorgimento and the Prussian drive for leadership in the North German Federation. At the same time, there were intensified nationalist struggles in the east. The Hungarian uprisings marked the beginning of the dissolution of the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, which eventually disintegrated into several sovereign states in 1918.

These developments on the political front might have been much slower if the spread of the political and cultural ideas of the French Revolution had not been paralleled by an equally profound transformation of the world economy. While the French revolutions did generate a variety of peripheral independence movements, their appeal was deeply affected by the changes wrought by the diffusion of the Industrial Revolution outwards from England. The development of an economy based on coal and steel triggered important changes in the equilibrium between core and periphery in Western Europe. The Industrial Revolution strengthened the economic dominance of the territories centred upon the North Sea, and at the same time increased the dependence of the traditional peripheries on these core economies. Equally important, within each territorial system these economic changes tended to consolidate its monopcephality or polyccephality that had emerged in earlier centuries.

These nineteenth-century developments differed fundamentally from other histories of territorial consolidation in Europe. These were not conquests of peripheral and backward rural lands from a dynastic centre, but invasions of economically and culturally advanced urbanised territories from military strongholds at the edges of each system, the German cities and principalities from Prussia, an agricultural–bureaucratic conquest state built up on the eastern periphery, the Italian cities and possessions from Savoy, a mountain pass state in control of one set of trade routes to the north. The nation-building histories of these latest of the larger states of Western Europe proved very different from those of the earlier ones: they not only had to cope over roughly the same period with issues of administrative unification (Phase I in Figure 11) and issues of national identity-building (Phase II); the territories they tried to unify were studded with urban centres accustomed for centuries to high levels of autonomy.

Prussia and Savoy made their greatest conquest inward toward the centre of Western Europe. Another power at the edge of Roman Europe, the Habsburgs, had for centuries tried to gain control over the territories of the old Central Empire and for a time was able to assemble a vast patchwork of possessions across the continent. The decisive thrusts of Habsburg expansion went eastwards, however, against the Ottoman Empire: the great military–administrative strength of the Habsburgs was built up in continuous wars against the Moslems much in the same way the monarchies of Castile–Aragon and of Portugal built themselves up in the Reconquista, in the fight to push the Arabs out of Europe. These power centres at the southeastern and northwestern corners of the territories of the Roman Church built up crusading frontier empires against the threatening infidels, against the rival world religion to the south. This helps to explain the very close symbiosis of Church and State in these empires: the military might of the state was a decisive instrument in the struggle for the expansion of Western Christendom.

[NATION-BUILDING: RELIGION AND LANGUAGE]

With the breakdown of Roman Catholic authority in the north, the Habsburg and the Iberian empires became the leading powers of the
Counter-Reformation and developed strong machineries for the repression of heresies. The Iberian empires brought the same fervour of orthodoxy across the ocean to the New World. The conquest of Latin America produced an even stronger fusion of religious, political, and economic institutions. These rigid structures proved effective in territories at a low level of mobilisation; they proved disastrous in the later phases of development.

The Habsburg Empire could not contain the proliferation of nationalist movements in the Balkans and in Central Europe: the Empire was finally reduced in 1918 to its heartland, the German-speaking provinces of Austria, and for a long period even this entity had to struggle for its sovereign status against the aggressive Pan-German forces centring on Berlin.

On the Iberian peninsula only Portugal succeeded in developing a homogeneous national culture: this, however, was achieved at a very low level of political mobilisation. Spain has to this day remained a state and not a nation: the Catalan and the Basque peripheries for centuries refused to identify with the power centre in Castile and have on several occasions been on the brink of secession. The Latin American empires broke up into a number of fragments from 1810 onward, but the heritage of the fused hierarchical structures weighed heavily on the elites of these new states: they could not get far toward the building of national identities (Phase II [in Figure 11]) without mobilising the subject strata into active participation in the system (Phase III), but no effective mobilisation could be brought about without changes in the inherited structures of dependence (Phase IV).

The Counter-Reformation brought about a fateful fusion of secular and religious powers in the crusading empires of the south. The break with the Roman Church brought about an even greater fusion in the northern states, particularly in the Lutheran monarchies. The properties of the Church and the Orders were confiscated and the clergy was incorporated into the administrative services of the territorial state. But there was one essential difference. In the north the state churches became major agencies of nation-building, in the south the Catholic Church retained its supraregional character and acted as a brake on all efforts to build up strong national identities. In fact the Reformation was as much a revolt against Latin as against the Pope and the Curia: the break with Rome not only nationalised religion, it legitimated the national vernaculars as languages of worship as well as of statecraft. The Protestant centres of the far north could pass quickly from state-building (Phase I) to nation-building (Phase II) and could develop unified cultures well before the era of mass politics (Phases III and IV).

Much depended, of course, on the initial conditions of ethnic and linguistic unification: how far could the collectivities around each centre actually agree on a common standard, how intractable were the linguistic peripheries? Sweden stands out as the most unified of all the Protestant nation-states. The territories acquired from Denmark and Norway at the heyday of her imperial power were quickly integrated into the national culture, and the one linguistically distinctive periphery, Finland, was ceded in 1809. England reached the same level of linguistic unification much earlier, but only within the strict confines of the medieval borders. The Scottish Lowlands and the Celtic fringes proved much more resistant to standardisation. Denmark also reached a high level of standardisation on the Islands and on Jutland down to Schleswig, but the German possession of the Danish dynasty were to prove an intractable problem for Danish politics during the decisive phase of emerging mass participation from 1848 to 1920.

In two of the Nordic secession states, the early politics of liberation centred on linguistic/cultural divisions: in Norway the conflict over linguistic standards reflected resistance to the centuries-old dependence on Danish culture; in Finland the Finns mobilised the peasantry against the linguistic standards imposed on them by the Swedish settler elite. Only Iceland escaped such divisions over linguistic identity. This distant island community had developed such strong literary traditions of its own in the Middle Ages and had reached such a high level of mass literacy at an early stage that there was no serious threat of submersion under an alien culture.

The territories of what we have called 'city-state Europe' developed strong linguistic standards without military-administrative centralisation: German in the north, Italian in the south. The Empire and the trade-route networks had been strong enough to produce some standardisation of the media of communication but too weak to unify the territories administratively. The two great powers on the eastern periphery were both part of this vast language community: Austria and Prussia were rivals for the control of the territories of Middle Europe,
but derived much of their strength from their subjection of other language areas to the east. These asymmetries between linguistic unification and military—administrative control go far to explain the intensity of the identity conflicts in the German Reich.

Toward the west of this broad Germanic language area only the Dutch could mobilise the cultural resources required for the development of a national standard of their own. The Belgians, the Luxembourgeois, and the Swiss simply accepted standards from outside. The Swiss built up their entire confederation on the principle of linguistic parity and proved able to build up a sense of political identity across two, later three, and even four distinctive language communities. The Luxembourgeois never tried to develop a national standard out of their Germanic vernacular: they simply accepted Hochdeutsch and French as their standards. The Belgians were caught between language areas of very different weight in the international system. French was the language of the educated elite, and for a long time Flemish was held in low esteem not only as a peasant vernacular, but also for a period as the language of the hated Calvinist masters to the north. The result was a cumulation of crises: the advent of mass democracy and the economic mobilisation of the Flemish peasantry triggered several waves of linguistic demands and in the end forced serious reconsideration of the structure of the Belgian state.

By contrast to Prussia and Austria, France developed a linguistic standard of her own and was able to force its acceptance throughout her territory: not only in Celtic Brittany, in the Languedoc, and in Provence, but even in the Germanic dialect areas of the north, in Alsace and in Lorraine. France and Sweden probably come closest to the ideal type of the ‘endoglossic’ homogeneous nation-state but with one marked difference: in Sweden this great feat of unification was achieved through the integration of the Church, and consequently the schools for mass education, within the apparatus of the state; in France it was brought about essentially through the military and the secular administrative agencies, with only incidental help from the Roman Catholic Church. The French were able to build up a unified nation-state without breaking with Rome. In contrast to the Counter-Reformation empires they were able to set strict limits to the powers of the Church, but they never proceeded to integrate the ecclesiastical agencies into the machinery of the state. The result was a protracted struggle between secular nation-builders and religious authorities throughout the first phase of mass politics: the church–state issue was to dominate French politics for close to a century and a half after the Great Revolution.

[CENTRE-BUILDING: LAW AND ECONOMY]

This quick summary of the geopolitical history of Western Europe has limited itself to three variables only: the location of the centre-building efforts—to the west or to the east of the trade-route belt from the Mediterranean to the north; the character of the linkage between Church and State in the efforts of territorial consolidation; the character of the efforts of linguistic standardisation and the extent of resistances to such efforts.24

We have only incidentally touched on the legal components of centre-building, we have pointed to the importance of the revival of Roman Law for the unification of trade belt Europe, and we have called attention to the distinctive legal developments within the national territories at the northern and the western edges of the central belt. Historians of legal development have repeatedly brought out this contrast in the political geography of Europe: the early development of distinctive national legal systems in the Germanic territories on the periphery, the revival of Roman Law within the territory of the old Central Empire, in Italy, in Catalonia, in Southern France (pays de droit écrit), in the Low Countries, and most of city-state Germany (for details see Smith 1928: esp. Chapters 39–44; Koschaker 1953; David and Brierley 1968: 21–18). The Romanisation of customary law was an essential characteristic of trade belt Europe. Roman Law cut across the congeries of city-states and principalties, and offered a useful set of principles for the conduct of transactions across open societies. In Hirschman’s term it was a law for exit [see Chapter I.1]. Only the peripheries were able to resist this transnational movement. In their isolation at the edges of Europe they were able to build up strong national or regional systems of law, the common law of England, the Jyske Lov in 1241, the Norwegian code in 1274, the general laws for the cities and the countryside established for Sweden and Finland in 1350. It is no accident of history that the Roman Law countries were the ones to take the lead centuries later in the struggle for a supra-
national Europe. The conflict over the extension of the Common Market is very much a conflict between the economically cross-cut city belt at the centre and the culturally distinctive territorial systems at the peripheries of this Roman Europe.

This contrast cannot be understood without further analysis of the economic conditions of centre-building. We have stressed the difficulties of territorial unification in the urbanised heartland of Europe but we have not discussed the very important variations on the economics of centre-building on the edges of this core territory.

Otto Hintze, Otto Brunner, Barrington Moore, and a number of other comparative historians have emphasised the crucial importance of the interaction between urban and rural economic resources for the structuring of the European state. To analyse such interactions within the framework of our geopolitical map we would have to add for each case information about the structure of land holdings during the period of state-building. One regularity stands out with great clarity even after only cursory analysis: the strongest of the early European nation-states were built up around territories with long histories of concentration in the ownership and control of land. England was a country of large estates; very similar structures also emerged in Scotland and in Ireland. France was regionally divided in the structure of its landed economy: large estates in the open-field country of the north, smaller holdings in the bocage country and the wine-producing areas. On the eastern fringe of trade-route Europe, Austria and Prussia were dominated by large and middle-sized estates of the Gutsherrschaft type. To the south, there were vast latifundia territories in Reconquista Spain, in Sicily, and parts of Bourbon Italy. By contrast, the smaller monarchies of the north were less dominated by large estates: Denmark and part of Southern Sweden, it is true, came close to the Prussian structure, but the rest of Sweden and quite particularly Norway had high proportions of small independent peasant holdings. The same was true for large stretches of ‘consociational Europe’: in the Low Countries, in Switzerland, and in major parts of western Germany (see Weis 1970), the holdings tended to be smaller and the peasantry freer.

These variations in the structure of the primary economy did not in themselves affect the character of the centre-forming process. What counted was the balance, the character of the integration between this rural economy and the urban. This is the thrust of Hintze’s classic analysis of variations in state-building in Europe (Hintze 1930); it is also the crux of Barrington Moore’s discussion of the contrasts between England and France, and England and Prussia (Moore 1966).
The process of territory-building in Europe found one of its expressions in the drive to develop standard languages. This in turn could smooth the task of sustaining ceremonies that transmitted the lore of the land and/or reaffirmed the territorial identity of the state: while these tasks could be effectively carried out by an efficient institutional network, the symbolism they were intended to convey would be much stronger if language and state were coterminous. The word nation had a meaning before the French Revolution very different from what it had afterwards. The original sense was the collectivity of those with the same pays de naissance, those born within the same historic space. The French Revolution pushed the term one notch upwards: it was to refer to all who lived within the entire territory of the French state and who understood the dialect of the Île de France. Nation-building accentuated the inter-intelligibility of dialects within the larger territory: the strategy was to create greater identity with the centre by increasing communication across localities with different dialects of what was defined as the same language.

It is tempting to compare this development towards political/administrative unification with the earlier process of religious unification within the great cross-territorial churches. When Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam spread messages of ultimate salvation across communities of very different ethnic origins and cultures, the local we-groups were not dissolved: as well as maintaining their identities, they were made aware through the institutional organisation of the church of their links with a wide range of different groups sharing the same faith, rituals, and holy places. Something very similar happened in the building of national communities. There is much to be said for Hobsbawm's (1972, also 1977) interpretation of nationalism as a civil religion, a body of conceptions, rituals, and rules of behaviour linking local communities together in a wider system.

The point to underscore is that several such religions can share the same linguistic standard, as in the German and French language areas, if there is sufficient distinctiveness in the other elements of identity. It is also important to point out that, where two groups share a common language and many other cultural characteristics, religion itself can take over this civic role of identity-building and boundary maintenance: Northern Ireland is a possible case in point. This is where Ernest Renan (1970) was right. The standard language of writing was not as important as the varied repertoire of signals and stigma of identity available to every individual in the immediate community, such as participation in rituals and ceremonies, observance of inherited customs and awareness of a shared past. But Renan was only vaguely aware of the layering of such expressions of identity: some accentuated membership in the local we-group, while others were shared across a range of communities and signalled loyalty to the wider territorial system. Individuals can possess more than one identity, and several layers of identity can exist within a single territorial system: whether these multiple identities are benign or antagonistic depends in each instance upon the particular political concatenation of events, policies, and trends.

Here we shall concentrate upon language as a focal point of identity, but not to the exclusion of everything else. While language is only one of several expressions of identity, it is the most pervasive and obvious stigma of distinctiveness. Moreover, it is not only a matter of private and individual preference: the ability to speak a language is of little value if there is no way in which the individual can use it. It is also a question of public recognition, of the legitimisation of standards: the use of a language is a collective act in which everyone in a territory must share, and it becomes politicised when a set of elite groups establishes a standard of written communication and lodges claims for its recognition in public life.

The building of a national territorial community in fact forced the great majority of subjects into some level of bilingualism: one language for close interaction within the immediate community, and at least one other for communication over longer distances. The first is the language of the home and local friendship circle, the other of markets, networks of external contacts, and agencies of control and administration. This distinction applies whether the standard of long-distance communication is unique to the system or is shared with another.
Whatever the structure of the territorial system, there will be at least two layers of language and identity: what counts is the distance between them and the costs of moving from one to another. In the classic nation-state the distance is taken to be small or even minimal: the medium of local communication is simply one of the set of intelligible dialects spoken across the entire territory and therefore very close to the standard developed from one or some subset of these. In practice there are much greater variations in the distance between the two layers. We can distinguish at least four gradations of distance between the home standard and the territorial standard:

1. The two are mutually intelligible: both are members of the same linguistic species. This is the classic case of easy transition from dialect to standard. The country closest to this type of minimal bilingualism is perhaps Sweden.

2. The two are not mutually intelligible, but the home dialect is a member of a linguistic species expressed in a distinctive and recognised alternative standard within the territory. This situation corresponds to those prevalent in what we [call] successful peripheries and multilingual systems [see below].

3. The two are not mutually intelligible, and the home dialect and its standard are not recognised by the central authorities. This situation is prevalent in what we [call] marginal peripheries [see below].

4. The two are not mutually intelligible, and the home dialect is a member of a linguistic species expressed in an external standard centrally established in a neighbouring territory and officially recognised within the territory of the speaker. Alternatively, the exoglossic standard may not be recognised within the territory of the speaker. These situations are those in our interface peripheries [see below].

These gradations in distance have sharp implications for the equality of citizenship. We can distinguish two very different kinds of citizen rights in a system of democratic pluralism: the right to respect for community of origin, whatever its language or ethnic composition, and the right to opportunities for full use of individual abilities within the wider territorial network. We can call the one the right to roots, the other the right to options. Roots are important because they help you know who you are and whom you can trust: they are the lifeblood of cultural identity. But options are equally important. You may not want to be locked in forever within the same community; you may wish to find a wider arena for the use of your talents. The problem is to find some acceptable fulcrum between these two orientations. Domination by roots may end up in social, cultural, and even economic servitude. The multiplication of options may result in anomia: a decrease in predictability, increased irresponsibility, and a heightened depersonalised anomie.

There is an enormous number of distinguishable languages in the world, but only a few of these rate a realistic chance to be transformed into standards of written communication. Such a standard cannot be developed without a centre or network, or a network of centres: writing was originally a prerogative of elites, and could be subjected to some sort of normative prescription only through constant interaction among groups with some competence in the given medium of communication. Once a standard had been established for some time and had found expression in writings of high prestige, it proved hard to replace: the costs of establishing an alternative were very high. Perhaps the greatest source of such stabilisation was the technology of mass reproduction of printing. Primarily, stable standards were most likely to develop in consolidated territorial structures built up around unambiguous centres before the advent of printing.

Territorial consolidation increased the opportunities for elite encounters over long distances. In turn, these increased the chances of acceptance of joint standards for ceremonial languages and for those of administrative and juridical communication. In Western Europe these processes of standardisation advanced between the eighth and twelfth centuries. The alphabetisation of vernaculars in the monasteries and church schools tended to stabilise standards and to prepare the ground for the unification of national languages. The first standard languages owe much to Gutenberg and the early printers: their decisions on orthography, arbitrary and historically questionable, tended to freeze standards. At least in the Protestant countries, the introduction of compulsory mass education later increased the pressures of standardisation.

There was, however, a second chance. Languages that failed to develop a definite standard with the arrival of printing could still become regular media of written communication if:

- the language was seen by important elites as a symbol of territorial identity;
there was a definite drive to reach agreement on a joint grammar and vocabulary for written expression;  
there were deliberate efforts to spread this joint version through use in religious or other symbolic ceremonies and through the media of mass education;  
schools in the peripheral language were established early on.

The developments in the cultural infrastructure paralleled changes in the economy. The commercial revolution increased the demand for competent communicators, and the growth of both administrative-juridical and military establishments created a territory-wide market for professionals skilled in the arts of reading and writing: the universities, once important agents responsible for the maintenance of Greek and Latin, also began to produce professionals in the vernacular languages. In the next round, the Industrial Revolution generated a demand for workers able to read instructions and manuals, and to learn new skills and techniques through literacy. These changes in the economy produced increasingly open markets for personnel across the entire territory of political systems and across a wide variety of occupations, and moved large numbers of people out of their peripheral or marginal conditions and into increasing contact with a territory-wide culture based upon written communication.

These developments strengthened enormously the weight of established linguistic standards and weakened the inherited parlers, patois, and dialects of the peripheries. As a general rule, we might say that the chances of survival of a peripheral language were severely reduced if it had not been standardised and had not become a medium of mass communication before the take-off in industrial development. Once a territory-wide labour market had been created, the resources for resistance against the central standard were drastically curtailed. In short, the changes in the economy created a new set of opportunity structures, and the choices made by ordinary people in these situations tended to seal the fates of the peripheral languages.

Six categories can be generated by combining two dimensions, the status of each language, and the linguistic system of the territory where it is used (see Figure 17):

- first, the successful centres, cases of continuing strengthening of the one central territorial language;
- the other cases are divided into five types:
  - central standard language: 
  - peripheral language: 
  - established official standard, but some autonomy/independence
  - marginal status

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistic System</th>
<th>Status of Language</th>
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<tr>
<td>Central standard</td>
<td>Peripheral language</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portuguese (I)</td>
<td>Alsatian (VI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>French (I)</td>
<td>Breton (V)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Occitan (V)</td>
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<td>Corsican (V)</td>
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<td>Franco-Provençal (VI)</td>
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<td>(Roussillon)</td>
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<td>English (I)</td>
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<td>Lallans (IV)</td>
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<td>Gaelic (V)</td>
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<td>Dutch (I)</td>
<td>Friesian (III)</td>
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<td>Catalan (II)</td>
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<td>Basque (IV)</td>
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<td>(boknål, nynorsk)</td>
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<td>French (II)</td>
<td>Finnish (III)</td>
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<td>Lappish (V)</td>
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<td>French (II) (Belgium)</td>
<td>Flemish (III)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alemanic Hoch-deutsch (II) (Switzerland)</td>
<td>French (III) (Lurs)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rhaeto-Romance (IV)</td>
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Note: The Roman numerals (I–VI) refer to the categories distinguished in the text.

Figure 17. A scheme for the classification of language in Western Europe
second, the multilingual structures, cases of federalising accommodation between two or more languages within the same politically defined territory;
• third, the victorious peripheries, cases of success in the establishment or maintenance of a distinctive standard language for the periphery;
• fourth, peripheries with weak standards but some level of autonomy, cases where a periphery proved unable to establish or maintain an effective standard of its own, but did achieve some level of political autonomy or independence;
• fifth, marginal peripheries, cases with neither an effective standard nor any significant level of autonomy;
• sixth, solutions at the interfaces, cases of strong cross-pres sure between major language communities.

[The first three categories are treated in this chapter, the other peripheries will be studied in the following chapter].

THE SUCCESSFUL CENTRES

These cases of early standardisation and successful development of the territorial language were of two kinds: territories consolidated around one centre before the Thirty Years' War, or multi-centred territories strongly marked by the imperial heritage. In the former the standard language tended to develop from the dialect of the core area; in the latter there tended to be a greater distance between the accepted written standard and the local elite languages. The eight languages in this category can be grouped as follows: early territorial consolidation and largely homogeneous populations (Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, The Netherlands); early territorial consolidation with markedly differentiated populations (England, France); imperial heritage with continued fragmentation and multiple centres, but with homogeneity of populations within the core territories (Germany, Italy).

The Portuguese state developed in isolation at the southwestern extreme of the European land mass. Its early structure, built up in the fight against the Muslims and the reconquest of the Algarve, proved strong enough to resist amalgamation into the wider Iberian alliance headed by Castile. Outside its borders, only to the north in Galicia was there a similar dialect and early literary culture. But with the consolidation of the Spanish empire in the sixteenth century there came a parting of the ways, and linguistic affinity across the border was never to produce political repercussions of any consequence. Internally, despite the later marked economic differences between north and south, Portugal remained a unified homogeneous nation, with increasing agreement on a common standard based on the dialects of the cultural centre, Coimbra, and the political centre, Lisbon.

Similar developments took place in two territories at the northern outskirts of the old empire. The territories of Denmark and Sweden were slowly consolidated within distinctive state structures after the tenth century. The various dialects of the two were relatively close to each other, and for a while it looked as if only one effective state structure would emerge. This possibility was broken by Sweden in 1522, and the Reformation and printing press helped to build two distinctive standards. The oral dialects did not disappear, and in the border areas it was originally a matter of indifference which standard was closer. This explains the Swedish success in integrating Scania and the other territories wrested from Denmark. It also helped that the conquest (1658) occurred before the introduction of compulsory mass education. There was no sudden imposition of a new standard: when people learned to read, they were made familiar with the Swedish standard.

The Dutch case was very different. The Low Countries had once been part of the Roman and Frankish empires, and formally remained imperial territories until 1648. They were typical city-belt territories: instead of consolidation during the Middle Ages, there was a system of interacting principalities and cities under some form of imperial feudal obligation. They were also culturally divided: the line between Germanic and Romance speakers, which today divides Belgium, has remained stable since the fifth century. After a brief consolidation under Burgundy after 1377, the Reformation and the protracted fight against the Habsburg Empire again divided the Low Countries. But this new and essentially religious line traversed the territories further north than the old linguistic divide. These developments left the Germanic regions in three distinctive parts: the southern, Catholic, provinces of Flanders and Brabant, a Calvinist centre dominated by Holland, and a Friesian north.
Economic development and dynamism gave Holland a dominant position in this new structure. Flanders, once the core of early northern capitalism, was left in Habsburg hands and stagnated until the twentieth century. Friesland remained largely a primary-producing periphery that became subordinated to Holland, the centre of the new Dutch state. The medieval literary standard that had flourished in Flanders and Brabant was gradually ‘northernised’, a process that continued into the nineteenth century.

Widespread agreement on a common standard, the Algemeen Beschaaft Nederlands, was reached after 1900, and this even broke through in Belgian Flanders in the 1950s. The process of linguistic homogeneity took much longer and was more painful than in Denmark or Sweden, but in the end the result was not too different. Flanders and Holland shared the same standard, which had also swamped Friesian.

English and French were languages of core territories consolidated against the Empire. In both cases there were great variations in linguistic expressions in the Middle Ages, followed by rapid standardisation in the wake of the invention of printing. But both languages were still limited to the core territories, facing a number of peripheral languages and patois. There was, however, a marked difference between the two countries in their policies towards these outlying areas. The English, having unified their core territory more thoroughly, were much more tolerant towards their peripheries: they allowed the Scots to retain a wide range of distinctive institutions within the Union of 1707, and for long pursued a policy of benign neglect towards the Welsh and Irish. The peripheries tended to be ignored rather than actively integrated.

In France the frustrations of a fragmented administrative structure produced a violent wave of centralisation during the revolution. In practice, this brought with it a further press of Gallicisation, of forced imposition of the Ile de France standard across all territories. The process of integration, however, was slow. It began in earnest only with the Industrial Revolution and the proliferation of new networks during the Third Republic (Weber 1977; also Serant 1965). The Jacobin ideology of the unitary nation-state combined with the pressures of the capitalist economy to penetrate and weaken the peripheral cultures. There was definitely a phase of cultural colonialism in France, assisted by the unification of the labour market, with the more backward peripheries treated not very differently from the overseas colonies acquired during the nineteenth century.

Portugal, England, France, Denmark, and Sweden all developed strong centres and distinctive standards at the fringes of the old empire. The Netherlands developed a dominant standard within the old imperial territory, but at a slower speed. Within the European urban polyccephalic federations (The Netherlands, Switzerland); after the French Revolution other fragmented territories were brought together under one leading centre without affecting the basic polyccephality of the city structure. The two territories (Italy, Germany) so consolidated had both developed strong literary standards of their own long before they were politically unified. In this respect they differed markedly from the empire-nations at the edge of the old empire.

What distinguished the German and Italian trajectories from those of all the other territories was this contrast in the timing of the two processes of unification: they were culturally unified several centuries before they were politically consolidated. In Italy, the Church had been successful in maintaining Latin as a standard of written communication after the fall of the Western Empire, but this was an elite language remote from the several regional oral dialects. With the rise of commercial capitalism and an expanding literate stratum in the cities, it proved impossible to maintain Latin as the dominant language of long-distance communication. Three standards competed with each other in the early phase of vernacularisation: Sicilian, Tuscan, and Venetian. By the fourteenth century, however, the prestige of Florence everywhere throughout the peninsula aided the acceptance of the Tuscan standard as the umanesimo volgare. While this did not reduce the distance between oral dialects, there was no serious counter-challenge, and, after the French Revolution and Risorgimento, no serious controversy over the national standard (Serrani 1972; Bechel- lioni 1970).

By contrast, developments in Germany did not start out from a single elite standard. A unified written language was very much a product of the joint colonisation of the eastern marchlands and the consequent intermingling of different dialects. The subsequent consolidation of the Hochdeutsch standard was decisively helped by the print-
ing press and the powerful impact of Martin Luther's translation of the Bible. Despite centuries of political fragmentation, Hochdeutsch formed the education standard for both Protestant and Catholic states in the west. With the decline of the Hanseatic League, it gradually superseded Niederdeutsch in Northern Germany. To the south, with the spread of trade across the Alps, German had become an important cross-local language of commerce. While the Alemannic Swiss established their independence in the fourteenth century, they did not break with the linguistic culture of Germany; Hochdeutsch was quickly accepted as the language of elite communication. Similar processes occurred in Austria and Prussia, areas that had not developed a cultural standard before the new printing technology changed the conditions for long-distance communication: both accepted Hochdeutsch as the standard of written communication.

THE MULTILINGUAL STRUCTURES

In six of the cases in category I, linguistic centralisation was a direct consequence of political centre-building, while in Germany and Italy there was a process of linguistic homogenisation within a decentralised network of elite interaction within the old imperial structures. We shall now look at the fewer cases of more deliberate linguistic accommodation within multilingual structures. Again, we must distinguish between two sets of original conditions: within the city belt, and on its periphery. The former produced two multilingual systems, Switzerland and Belgium. On the periphery one crusading empire, Spain, had to resort in part to a federal alliance strategy in the conquest of its territories.

Multilingual structures were more likely to develop in territories with strong federalising traditions, in boundary zones between major language groups, or in military alliances among territorial systems of near-equal strength. However, the cases differ too much from each other and are too few to permit pushing such a simple summary too far. While all are officially multilingual, they differ markedly in the strength of the constituent languages. There was never any question of linguistic equality: in all three cases one language has been historically predominant. The Swiss structure was for long the most balanced, but there was never any doubt about the economic and demographic preponderance of the Alemannic German community. For at least a century after its foundation, the Belgian state had a strongly skewed structure: French was unquestionably the elite language, and it is only since the 1950s that some degree of equilibrium with Flemish has been established. There has been no such [strong] trend towards equilibrium in Spain. While the three major regional languages—Catalan, Basque, and Galician—have received some level of official recognition, this is counteracted by a marked demographic imbalance. Spain differs also on other counts. Belgium and Switzerland were buffer territories and did not develop indigenous standards, while Spain had at least four endoglossic standards.

For Switzerland exoglossic standardisation was perhaps the simplest strategy in the building up of a strong federation. It would have been vastly more costly to enforce one endoglossic Alemannic standard in Germanic Switzerland; this would have given one dialect a distinct privilege. It was much easier to accept an external standard equally remote from all the local dialects, and one least likely to disturb the federation. With geographical expansion the Swiss persisted with federation at all levels except the economic, giving formally equal power to all cantons, establishing religious parity and equalising the position of dialects by accepting exoglossic standards. The one exception confirms the utility of the linguistic strategy. The Rhaeto-Romantic communities in the Grisons (Graubünden) could not look to any external standard, and perhaps because of this could not agree upon a standard of their own. To the extent that the linguistic groups in Switzerland have accepted a high degree of separateness, the resulting centripetality has paradoxically provided not only accommodation, but also integration (Schermerhorn 1970: 77–85).

In Switzerland there was never any doubt about the primacy of the territorial principle, at the communal as well as the cantonal level. In the Bernese Jura the Francophones could send their children to schools in their own language whenever they were in a majority locally, but only rarely could they gain influence within the large German-dominated canton of Berne. Religion and economics, however, served to divide the French-speaking Jura. The Protestants in the south had always been closer to the German speakers in Berne than the northern Catholics. Moreover, the south had been industrialised over a much
longer span of time and was closer to the advanced centres of the Swiss economy.

However, the general increase in the absolute level of prosperity permitted a large number of Jurassiens to stay within their local communities and reject the lures of the outside labour market. The demand for control over a distinctive linguistic standard was linked to the belief that people could afford to stay in the French-speaking environment, that they did not have to submit to the discipline of bilingualism within a cross-local labour market. In the south the great majority were already in this cross-local labour market. The north-south contrast was heightened because of the primacy in Switzerland of the territorial principle. The demand for an equal status for French could most easily be resolved by the establishment of a separate French-speaking canton, and constitutionally this could be reached only through a series of referenda at all levels, including the communal. It was the referenda at the communal level within the Jura that settled the territorial and linguistic issue. The monolingual canton of Jura established in the 1970s was much smaller than the historic territory, and excluded most of the Protestant south.41

The Jura represents a case of successful mobilisation of linguistic identity within the Swiss Confederation. Developments in the Grisons (Graubünden) were very different. In the Jura there was never any doubt about the vitality of the linguistic standard: it was exoglossic, but made for a unified linguistic community. In the Grisons there was no such unity. At least six different dialects could be found, each with a separate standard. While all were members of the Rhaeto-Romance language group, the fragmented geography of the region simply did not make it possible for them to accept a common standard. The first organisation to defend the dialects, the Lia Rumantscha, appeared only in 1919, yet this was still before the appearance of anything approximating an open labour market. Accommodation was reached in 1938 with a subsidy given to the Lia and the recognition of Rhaeto-Romansch as the fourth language of the confederation. Yet this meant little in practice. Because of the dialectal diversity, the language could be used only in the local schools, and the canton continued to be administered in German. Moreover, despite provisions for language teaching and broadcasting, the number of speakers in the canton has slowly but steadily declined (Steinberg 1976: 114–16).42

While Switzerland had the good fortune to be caught in a vice between three high-prestige languages, the Belgian state was trapped in a state of disequilibrium. One exoglossic standard was that of a great European power; the other of a politically much weaker unit. French was the language of the nation-building elites, while Flemish, for all the glories of its medieval flowering, was primarily a set of rural dialects. The great change came with World War II. Flanders was transformed into a booming industrial region, and the northern Dutch standard was accepted in the 1950s. Economic change and government expansion generated a growing market for skilled workers, professionals, and bureaucrats in Flemish (Heisler 1974: 200) and a corresponding upsurge of recruitment of Flemish speakers into higher education: it was this new generation that increasingly rejected the dominance of the Francophone elites. More generally, despite the elitist position of French, Flemish had survived as the popular language within the province. Partly because of this strength, the Flemings were able, with economic development and political mobilisation, not only to win equal rights for their language, but also to secure its exclusive dominance within their own territory. The focus of the Belgian political problem was increasingly the greater Brussels area, historically Flemish but experiencing more and more Francophone settlement. Brussels highlighted a question that is crucial not only to Belgium: can you combine a system of territorial federal accommodation with a system of personal rights and communalism?

By contrast to the Nordic cases [analysed below], the Flemish movement in Belgium and the Francophone movement in the Bernese Jura are cases of successful vindication of linguistic rights within multilingual systems. In both, the problem concerned the legitimation of an exoglossic standard in a peripheral territory. Flemish was for long merely a set of dialects of the dominant language to the north: the Flemings were culturally as well as politically and economically peripheral. By contrast, while the French speakers in the Jura had been thoroughly peripheralised both economically and politically, their language was that of a great power, and one that was accepted as a standard elsewhere in Switzerland. There was another difference: the Jura was divided in its religion between a Catholic north and a Protestant south, whereas Flanders was much more homogeneously Catholic. Finally, the Flemish territory was much larger geographically and de-
mographically within Belgium than the Jura within Berne. But whatever the differences in the conditions, the Flemish movement and the Jurassiens, albeit only recently, both succeeded in reasserting their distinctiveness of their territories and language.

The situation has been more skewed in Spain [although it] began with strong federalising characteristics. The Iberian alliance against the Muslims has some parallels with the Swiss fight against the German emperors. However, the Iberian allies were dynastic, not peasant republics or corporations of burghers, while the Reconquista opened vast territories in the south for colonisation. While in the early phase of the Reconquista there was some doubt about the outcome of the struggle for political hegemony, by the end of the fifteenth century the issue was settled. Castile was the dominant partner, acquiring control over large expanses of territory. But Aragon and Catalonia never accepted their fate, rebelling again and again, and refusing to succumb to Castilianisation. What was even more important was that Catalonia, part of the medieval trade belt, developed great economic strength to compensate for the loss of political power, and, being an independent centre economically aided efforts to maintain a distinctive language. Catalan did not lose its hold on the native population through continuous out-migration: on the contrary, the greatest linguistic danger was the constant immigration of Castilian speakers into the industrial growth centres around Barcelona (Rossingol 1974; Perez-Alonso 1979).

[Thus we find in Spain a combination of] strong peripheral identities, but long and bitter conflicts over political autonomy. Spain has had a medieval legacy of federalism, but surges of Castilian centralisation in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries triggered increasingly embittered responses in the peripheries. Three territories led the struggle against Castilian dominance: the alternative centre in Aragon–Catalonia, the border periphery of the Basque provinces, and the external periphery of Galicia. The three differed markedly in geopolitical and geo-economic position. Catalonia had been an alternative centre which had never meekly accepted integration into the new Spanish empire. The Basques were never part of an imperial centre. Rather, to protect their border the Spanish kings had given the Basques south of the Pyrenees a number of privileges (fueros), setting them apart from the rest of the state’s population. This grant of what amounted to collective nobility (Greenwood 1977) no doubt heightened the pride and separateness of the Basques: they were already set apart from the Spaniards by language. Linguistic tension was accentuated after the Liberal victory in 1833, with the Basques committed to defending the fueros against the centralising forces in Madrid. Further embitterment over the same theme arose out of the nineteenth-century Carlist wars and the Civil War of the 1930s, though the Carlist outcome underscored the difficulties of establishing an alliance between the Church and the defenders of the peripheral culture. By the 1970s the Basque culture was severely fragmented along several dimensions—political, religious, and economic.

Linguists normally distinguish seven dialects, three in Spain and four in France, without a unified standard. Moreover, Basque was never given official status until after the demise of the Franco regime. This produced the same kind of tension as in Wales: some protagonists give priority to the fight for the language, others to control of the historic territory.

The Catalan and Basque peripheries differ on many counts, but they have one feature in common: they are economically advanced while politically subjected and culturally opposed to the dominant Castilian standard. In comparing Flanders and the Jura we discussed the importance of affording one’s distinctive culture: this was a matter not only of absolute welfare, but also of the fit between the language community and the cross-local labour market. The same regularity can be observed in the Catalan and Basque cases, but there the feeling of pride in local achievements combined with a rejection of the policies of the centre. In addition, the openness of the Spanish labour market created difficulties for the Basques and Catalans in sharp contrast to those of the Flemings and Jurassiens: the flow of immigrants from the political centre to the rich peripheries intensified the difficulties for the endogenous languages.

THE VICTORIOUS PERIPHERIES

Here we shall simply reckon as victorious those that were able to establish and maintain their own linguistic standards, to which the bulk of the territorial population remained loyal [and/or which attained political independence: the Nordic countries, Luxembourg, Ireland]. The Nordic victories were the most complete: these peripheries not only
established dominant standards within their territories, but also achieved political independence. Luxembourg was caught between two external standards, but succeeded in promoting its local dialect as an alternative standard of official communication. The case of Luxembourg exemplifies one possible path of linguistic upgrading: political independence, then legitimation of a distinctive standard for the territory. Ireland is the only instance of full sovereignty without successful assertion of linguistic distinctiveness.

In the Nordic cases two factors proved important: inter-intelligibility of the peripheral and metropolitan languages, and direct demographic contacts between the native populations and settlers from the dominant culture. The distance between the peripheral and the colonial elite language was much greater in Finland than elsewhere. The structure and vocabulary of Finnish were very different, and took a great deal of effort for a Swedish speaker to learn. By contrast, the distance between the Danish metropolitan language and the local languages and dialects in Norway was much less pronounced. In fact, the printing standard established in Copenhagen was for centuries accepted in Norway as an expression of the oral languages, at least as pronounced by the educated elites. The distance to Icelandic was greater, but there, perhaps partly because of its remote location, much of the older literature was disseminated through locally and manually reproduced versions.

What was different in Finland was the proximity and nature of the Swedish settlement: rural communities in Ostrobothnia and the southwestern archipelago, and a set of resource-controlling elites along the southern coast. These two sets of Swedish speakers did not interact closely until the nineteenth century, when they sought mutual protection from the initial waves of Finnish nationalism. While the position of the Swedish minority as a whole was strengthened through this alliance, the Swedish elite had a direct interest in the development of a broadly-based Finnish movement as an essential element in a strategy to protect the inherited structure of government against the Russian centre (see Alapuro 1982). Nationalism served as a civil religion safeguarding the Finnish state, and for this reason it proved possible to reach agreement on measures of accommodation between the two linguistic communities. The Finnish language was placed on an equal footing with Swedish in 1883, and by the time of the 1919 Constitu-

tion the process of equalisation had gone so far as to make it relatively easy to establish the detailed rules of the 1922 Languge Act for the determination of the rights of each community.

The situation in Norway was different. Upon independence in 1814 the written and printed standard was Danish, but the language was pronounced differently throughout the country. The history of the liberation of Norwegian from the Danish inheritance is largely the history of the reduction of this distance between the written and the oral language. This process occurred during a period of expanding education, accelerating modernisation, and widespread political mobilisation: the result was protracted conflicts, first over the urban standard due to replace Danish as the written norm, and then between this standard and an indigenous counter-standard developed out of rural dialects. By 1907 the urban standard (riksmål, later called bokmål) was clearly distinctive from Danish, despite some conflict over orthography and vocabulary content. The conflict was reinforced by the powerful upsurge of the intellectual construction of the landsmål (later called nynorsk) counter-standard. Nynorsk caught on not only within the rural areas of the south and west; it became an expression of identity for the rising peasant intelligentsia after 1870. The broad left alliance (venstre) took up its cause and forced through legislation to recognise nynorsk as an official norm, both of administrative communication and in the schools. The nynorsk movement reached its peak between the two world wars: continued urbanisation after 1945 reduced its numerical strength (Haugen 1966: 309), but this popular decline was paralleled by its increasing adoption within intellectual circles, a development that helped to enrich both languages.

In Iceland the movement for national cultural independence proved successful, but the conditions for their development were different. Iceland had established a strong literary standard during the Middle Ages, the survival of which was assisted by the island’s remote location. It was confirmed after the Reformation with the translation of the Bible into classic Icelandic. As a result, even though Danish increasingly became the language of administration, Icelandic remained the language of the church. The indigenous standard was so well-rooted that, by the time of the nationalist upsurge and the re-establishment of the Althing in the nineteenth century, it was recognised by Denmark as the only official language on the island.
The case of Luxembourg exemplifies [another] possible path of linguistic upgrading: political independence, then legitimation of a distinctive standard for the territory, \textit{Letzterzvöischt}, the primary language of Luxembourg, is essentially a Germanic dialect. Its fate was changed by the recognition in 1815 of Luxembourg as a sovereign state. This tiny buffer territory had to develop a policy of flexible adaptation to its giant neighbours: its professionals were trained either in France or Germany, and used both exoglossic standards in administration, law, and legislation. The local dialect developed a written standard very late, but in 1912 was introduced as an obligatory language of instruction in the schools. The decisive change, however, came in World War II. As part of the aversion to everything German, \textit{Letzterzvöischt} increasingly replaced \textit{Hochdeutsch}, and today has equal status with French in internal administration, though the latter dominates in external communications.\textsuperscript{50}

What makes Ireland interesting is the failure of the nationalist movement to make the old language an efficient medium of everyday communication. Irish had been the first Western European language to replace Latin and Greek as a medium of learning, with a strong literature from the sixth century onwards. Decline set in with the Reformation and increasing English dominance. The great surge of Catholic mobilisation in the nineteenth century only served to weaken further the position of the old language: the Catholic Church retained its hold on the peasantry, but did nothing to strengthen the language. Its support for full citizenship for Catholics was not a demand for separate linguistic status; the concern was with control of education and access to the vast English labour market. These interacted in the mid-nineteenth century (Akenson 1970) to reinforce an already established trend: the Industrial Revolution, by opening up a market for the services of the Irish peasantry, had already broken down their isolation from the English language.\textsuperscript{51}

When the Gaelic League launched its campaign for the Irish language in the 1890s, it was already too late to stem the tide. A desperate effort at revival after independence also proved to be in vain: Irish might have been established as the official language of the new state and been made obligatory in education and as a requirement for some civil service jobs, but this did not make it a living, dynamic language. Moreover, standardisation, to the extent that it was achieved, did not come about until the publication of an official grammar in 1953 (O'Cuív 1969: 22–34). However, the decline in the active use of Irish did not affect the strength of ethnic identity: there are many other ways of signalling belonging to a ‘we’ group. In Ireland the distinctive and pervasive presence of Catholicism helped to preserve a sense of separateness, as did the burning grievances over land ownership. These were reinforced by the nature of the central British presence, uncaring as much as repressive. And after 1922 the symbolism could be concentrated on the issue of the partition of the island: the border between the Republic and Northern Ireland, one of the least impervious in Europe, has retained a high degree of symbolic rigidity.

Ireland is the only instance of full sovereignty without successful assertion of linguistic distinctiveness: by contrast, Scotland represents successful maintenance of distinctive identity-maintaining institutions without full sovereignty and without a separate language. Scotland accepted the exoglossic standard of the dominant centre, never in fact even trying to replace English, and even the most ardent nationalists have never pushed hard for a distinctive Scots written standard. This goes \textit{a fortiori} for Gaelic, and there is no possibility that this remote language would acquire even ceremonial status within an independent Scotland. What makes Scotland unique in Europe is the combination of a strong historical consciousness of separate identity with a complete disinterest in the development of a distinctive language. The divorce between a persisting institutional structure and the language parallels that between ‘civil society’ and the state stressed by Nairn (1977: 139).

We might even say that the Scottish elites traded off their right to a distinctive language against the profitable advantages of integration with the English economy. After the thirteenth century a variety of English steadily spread over the whole of the Scottish Lowlands, but it was a variety clearly distinctive from that spoken to the south. At the same time, the Scottish state was politically flawed, and the centre proved unable to impose any regular administration or an effective standard of communication over all its hinterlands. While Scotland built up an effective range of institutions that served to maintain identity and to act as agencies of indigenous elite recruitment, linguistically it looked to the standard south of the border (Urwin 1978). Mass education may have come early (at the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury), but under the control of the Scottish Church the dominant language of instruction was English, even in the Highlands.

The Scottish case clearly illustrates the importance of the timing of standardisation and self-assertion. There was no separate Scottish standard before Union and the Industrial Revolution; and once that revolution had produced all its benefits to the Lowland centres of the Scottish economy, there was little incentive to reject English as the dominant standard of communication. In any case, the alternative standard of Gaelic was rejected even more decisively by groups in the Scottish centre. Compared with Ireland, the intermingling with English took place at a very different level. In the Scottish case there was interaction, if not integration, predominantly at the elite and middle-class level, while in the Irish the interaction was more frequently at the working-class level. This contrast in the class level of the process of interaction goes far to explain differences in the character of later political conflicts between the periphery and the metropolitan centre: the concentration on economic issues in Scotland, the cumulation of ethnic, religious, and class cleavages in Ireland.