Filosofijos institutas kviečia į filosofo Colino R. Careto paskaitas. Colinas R. Caretas yra Teorinės filosofijos grupės narys Utrechto universitete Nyderlanduose. Tame pačiame universitete jis taip pat dėsto į žmogų orientuoto dirbtinio intelekto programoje bei vadovauja filosofijos, dirbtinio intelekto ir mokslo istorijos ir filosofijos studentams. Jo pagrindinės tyrimų sritys yra filosofinė logika, epistemologija ir mokslo filosofija. Jo publikacijose daugiausia tyrinėjami klausimai susiję su loginiu ir matematiniu pliuralizmu, racionaliu nuomonės pakeitimu apie fundamentalius klausimus ir įsitikinimo būsenos neskaidrumu (susijusiu su logine visažinyste). Jis taip pat domisi savitomis skepticizmo ir idealizmo rūšimis būdingomis ankstyvam daoizmui ir ankstyvam budizmui. Daugiau apie jo tyrimus galite sužinoti čia. Vilniaus universiteto Filosofijos fakultete Colinas R. Caretas skaitys dvi viešas paskaitas anglų kalba, be vertimo.
2025-11-04, 17.00–18.30 (Spa 210 aud., Šv. Jono g. 4)
Two Myths About Obvious Implications
Formal models of rational belief use the tools of logic and probability. Many of these models are normatively suspect. According to minimal rationality theory, this is because these models ignore practical constraints on the proper function of cognition. Minimally rational belief has some, but not all logical structure. In this talk, I want to point out an unnoticed tension between two recent approaches to this kind of project, viz. Jago's triviality-based model and Berto's topic-based model. Both theories are interesting and insightful. To the extent that they each rightly point out a cause of logical incompleteness in rational belief, these theories cannot be entirely correct. I develop a model that synthesizes ideas from both sides. On this model, it is indeterminate whether a rational agent believes certain implications of her beliefs, even when they are clearly on a relevant topic of inquiry.
2025-11-06, 15.00–16.30 (313 aud., Universiteto g. 9, Vilnius)
Saying What Cannot be Said
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein tries to explain the function of language in terms of how it mirrors the world. At the end of the book he suggests that this is impossible, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." (TLP 7) In his Philosophical Investigations, he changes his mind and suggest that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language." (PI 43) In this lecture, I will show how a modern version of Later Wittgenstein's ideas can support a coherent interpretation of the paradoxical statements of Early Wittgenstein.